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EXTENDING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS  
BY WAY OF THE AFRICAN CHARTER 
 
Judith Murphy* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Indigenous peoples make up 350 million of the world’s 
population.1  While the meaning of indigeneity is contentious 
for both academics and lawmakers,2 “[t]he term indigenous [is] 
derived from the Latin indigena” and connotes societies with 
longstanding ties to particular areas of the world.3  Ancestral 
origins and traditional systems of tenure define customary 
indigenous relationships with land,4 relationships that have 
proven historically to be problematic.  Because indigenous 
peoples organize their society’s access to land communally, their 
practices are not acknowledged or valued by many national 
governments.5  Prevailing “[e]urocentric notions of individual 
property ownership tied primarily to economic value”6 foster 
                                                          
* Judith Murphy is a Juris Doctor candidate at Pace University School of 
Law (expected May 2012). She served as the Managing Editor of the Pace 
International Law Review for Volume XXIV. She is grateful for the hard 
work and dedication of the journal’s staff and editorial board.  
1 Michaela Pelican, Complexities of Indigeneity and Autochthony: An 
African Example, 36 AFR. ETHNOLOGIST 52, 56 (2009). 
2 Id.  
3 Dorothy L. Hodgson, Introduction: Comparative Perspectives on the 
Indigenous Rights Movement in Africa and the Americas, 104 AM. 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 1037, 1038 (2002). 
4 See Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion & 
Prot. of Minorities, Standard-Setting Activities: Evolutions of Standards 
Concerning the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Comm’n on Human Rights, ¶ 
24, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2 (June 10, 1996) (by Erica-Irene A. 
Daes) [hereinafter Standard-Setting Activities]. 
5 William van Genugten, Protection of Indigenous Peoples on the African 
Continent: Concepts, Position Seeking, and the Interaction of Legal Systems, 
104 AM. J. INT’L L. 29, 33 (2010); see AFRICAN COMM’N ON HUMAN & PEOPLES’ 
RIGHTS & INT’L WORK GRP. FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE AFRICAN 
COMMISSION’S WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS ON INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS 
/COMMUNITIES 21 (2005) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION’S 
WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS].    
6 Lilian Aponte Miranda, Uploading the Local: Assessing the 
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“‘[a]dherence by many states’ legal systems to [notions of] 
individual property rights’”7 and contribute to a common reality 
of indigenous peoples being forced off their land “to give way 
for the economic interests of . . . large-scale development 
initiatives that tend to destroy their lives and cultures.”8  Land 
dispossession is a major source of difficulty for indigenous 
peoples.9  Its implications are acute and, in recent years, there 
has developed, particularly within the international legal field, 
human rights discourses related to the protection of indigenous 
ways of life.   
This Note discusses indigeneity through the prism of the 
Endorois tribe’s experiences in Kenya.  The Endorois are an 
indigenous group whose traditional pastoralist mode of life in 
the Lake Bogoria region of Kenya’s Rift Valley10 saw profound 
changes with the colonization of the British in the late 19th 
century.  The colonial implementation of a legal system 
anchoring property rights in the colonial Kenyan state11 had 
grave implications for the Endorois, as Kenya’s post-colonial 
adoption of British jurisprudential mores12 legalized the 
conversion of their land for state purposes as well as their 
eviction from the area surrounding Lake Bogoria.13   
This Note discusses the Endorois’ endeavor to reclaim their 
land through the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights’ 2010 decision: Centre for Minority Rights Development 
(Kenya) v. Kenya.  In this case, the African Commission applied 
provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights and afforded the Endorois, vis-à-vis this treaty, legal 
entitlement to claims of religion, property, culture, natural 
                                                                                                                                  
Contemporary Relationship Between Indigenous Peoples’ Land Tenure 
Systems and International Human Rights Law Regarding the Allocation of 
Traditional Lands and Resources in Latin America, 10 OR. REV. INT’L LAW 
419, 428 (2008).   
7 van Genugten, supra note 5, at 33. 
8 Id. at 33–34.  
9 Id. at 32. 
10 Cynthia Morel, Defending Human Rights in Africa: The Case for 
Minority and Indigenous Rights, 1 ESSEX HUM. RTS. REV. 54, 56 (2003). 
11 Korir Sing’ Oei A. & Jared Shepard, ‘In Land We Trust’: The Endorois’ 
Communication and the Quest for Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Africa, 16 
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57, 60 (2010). 
12 Id. 
13 Morel, supra note 10, at 56.  
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resources, and development in their traditional lands.14  
 Part II of this Note discusses indigenous rights in the 
historical context.  Part III discusses indigenous rights in the 
African context.  Part IV discusses indigenous rights in the 
Kenyan context.  Part V discusses the Endorois rights’ apropos 
these discussions.  Finally, Part VI draws conclusions, obser-
ving that the Endorois’ case represents an extension of 
developing international law related to indigenous peoples.   
II. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS HISTORICALLY 
A. The Doctrines of Discovery and Terra Nullis 
Legal proscription of indigenous rights to land had its 
nascence in colonial jurisprudence.  When European sovereigns 
began sending ships overseas on missions of colonization in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, they adopted the Doctrine of 
Discovery, a legal maxim espousing the idea that “discovering 
[European] countr[ies] automatically gained sovereign and 
property rights in the lands” they found.15  Discovery conferred 
title to European nations and, in this respect, it meant that 
Europeans overwrote patterns of tenancy in land “already 
owned, occupied, and used” by native peoples.16  At first, 
though “debates ensued regarding the appropriate relationship 
between . . . [the colonies’ original inhabitants] and [the] 
colonizing powers . . . [, ultimately, the former] were . . . 
constructed as irrational, uncivilized savages”17 in European 
systems of thought and, thus, became “legally irrelevant” to 
European rationales of conquest.18  Because native religions did 
                                                          
14 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya) v. Kenya, Commc’n  No. 276/03, 
Afr. Comm’n H.P.R. (Feb. 10, 2010). 
15 Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine of Discovery in American Indian Law, 42 
IDAHO L. REV. 1, 5 (2005); see also Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 562 
(1823) (holding “[d]iscovery [to be] the original foundation of titles to land on 
the American continent as between the different European nations, by whom 
conquests and settlements were made.”).  
16 Miller, supra note 15, at 5. 
17 Miranda, supra note 6, at 425.  
18 Siegfreid Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1141, 1153 (2008). 
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not fit within Christian norms19 and because native societies 
“did not resemble the contours of the territorial [European] 
state, indigenous peoples were not considered [to be the proper] 
subjects of . . . [the] law.”20 According to European 
jurisprudence, indigenous peoples had no basis for exercising 
legal authority, as the law itself was applicable only to 
“civilized states,”21 colonial dominion over native lands resting 
on the “legal fiction that indigenous territory was unoccupied . . 
. terra nullius,”22 or vacant land. 
In the African context, the Doctrine of Discovery proved 
particularly egregious.  Although, at the time of European 
colonization, African societies were already organized into 
nations defined by ethnic communities sharing common 
territories, languages, cultures, and traditions,23 Africans were 
construed in the European imagination to be stateless, “‘pre-
law’ people[s] who were [conquerable as] morally inferior and 
intellectually immature.”24  European colonial powers depicted 
the African continent to be “a lawless basket case,”25 avowing 
that “Africa had no history prior to direct contact with 
Europe”26 in order to support “the notion that Africa was terra 
nullius—a no-man’s historical and cultural wasteland ready to 
                                                          
19 Robert A. Williams, The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the 
Status of the American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 
12 (1999) (noting that, according to European conceptions, “[t]he State, being 
of earthly origin and therefore without the ‘power to raise itself above the 
insufficiency of a piece of human handiwork,’ required the authority of the 
divinely willed Church ‘to acquire the divine sanction as a legitimate part of 
that Human Society which God ha[d] willed.’”).      
20 Miranda, supra note 6, at 426.   
21 Anthony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism 
in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (1999).  
22 Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Recognition in International Law: 
Theoretical Observations, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 177, 184 (2008).   
23 Makau Wa Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural 
Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 339, 
365 (1995).  
24 Makau Mutua, Africa: Mapping the Boundaries in International Law, 
104 AM. J. INT'L L. 532, 535 (2010) [hereinafter Mutua, Mapping the 
Boundaries] (book review).  
25 Jeremy I. Levitt, Introduction—Africa: A Maker of International Law, 
in AFRICA: MAPPING NEW BOUNDARIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (Jeremy I. 
Levitt ed., 2008).  
26 Mutua, Mapping the Boundaries, supra note 24, at 534.   
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/5
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be taken over.”27  In 1884, when France, Britain, and Germany 
initiated the Berlin Conference in order to soothe colonial 
friction over African territorial disputes, the European 
sovereigns ended up parsing out title to the continent without 
reference to its indigenous inhabitants.28  African peoples, in 
European law, “were too primitive to understand the concept of 
sovereignty and, hence, were unable to cede it by treaty” at the 
Berlin Conference.29   
Legally, only pacts between European states had import 
with respect to Africa.30  Citing notions of terra nullis, “the 
colonial authorities in Africa bundled together all the incidents 
of property and assigned them to the . . . control of the state.”31  
Under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890 in British African 
territories, for example, the crown seized control over all land 
whether there were native peoples on it or not.32  Colonial 
“administrators [asserted] that ‘native law and custom’ was 
merely a stage in the evolution of Africans societies . . . [that] 
would wither away as western civilization became 
progressi[vely] dominant in African social relations.”33  There 
was, in European eyes, “no need to acknowledge . . . customary 
[African] land tenure as a system of rights and duties.”34  
Indigenous peoples were irrelevant to European schemes of law 
and any claims to land they recognized were deemed legally 
nonexistent and overwritten. 
B. Postcolonial Mores and the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
After World War II, when colonial governments all over 
the world began to break up, the lack of recognition for 
indigenous peoples under the law remained largely unchanged.  
                                                          
27 Id. 
28 See Anghie, supra note 21, at 58. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 78.    
32 See H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, The Tragic African Commons: A Century of 
Expropriation, Suppression and Subversion, in LAND REFORM AND AGRARIAN 
CHANGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 6 (Programme for Land & Agrarian Studies, 
Occasional Paper Ser. No. 24, 2002). 
33 Id. at 8. 
34 Id. 
5
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Although new discourses on human rights and self-
determination began to appear internationally in instruments 
like the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights, these discourses were “focused on [the rights of] 
individuals [vis-à-vis states]—in part because talk of minorities 
and ethnic groups had been tarnished by Nazi ideology.”35  
Overall, at the beginning of colonial independence in the 1960s, 
while decolonization projects advanced the right of peoples to 
shape their own realities, the concept of self-determination 
“applied only to an overseas colonial territory as a whole, 
irrespective of pre-colonial enclaves of indigenous peoples 
existing within the colonial territories and colonizing states.”36  
Legally, there was no focus on an idea of collective rights for 
peoples within the territory of discrete nations.    
It was not until the last three decades of the 20th century 
that indigenous peoples began to receive the attention of 
international lawmakers.37  In the 1960s and 1970s, after 
having gained momentum from decolonization and the 
proliferation of non-governmental organizations,   
a great number of indigenous peoples’ organizations[] were 
established at [both] national and international level[s] . . . [and 
an indigenous movement was born.]  The issues that fuelled the 
movement ranged from broken treaties and loss of land to 
discrimination, marginalization, conflict and gross violations of 
human rights . . . Although most of the activities of the . . . 
movement took place outside the environs of the United Nations, 
. . . [i]n 1971, the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention and 
Protection of Minorities commissioned a study on ‘discrimination 
against indigenous populations.’38 
The study, named the Cobo Report after Jose Martinez Cobo, 
the Special Rapporteur to the Sub-Commission on the Prevention 
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, took over ten years 
to complete, examined the economic, social, cultural, political, 
and legal circumstances that indigenous peoples faced, and 
                                                          
35 John R. Bowen, Should We Have a Universal Concept of 'Indigenous 
Peoples' Rights?: Ethnicity and Essentialism in the Twenty-first Century, 16 
ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 12 (2000). 
36 Miranda, supra note 6, at 426. 
37 Macklem, supra note 22, at 198. 
38 Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/5
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made recommendations as to their rights to health, housing, 
education, language, culture, land, politics, religion, and 
equality.39   
Importantly, the Cobo Report established for the first time 
a working legal definition of indigenous peoples.  They became: 
those wh[o] have a historical continuity with pre-invasion and 
pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider 
themselves distinct from other sectors of societies now prevailing 
in those territories, . . . and are determined to preserve, develop, 
and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, a[s 
well as] their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued 
existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural 
patterns, social institutions and legal systems.40 
As a result of the Cobo Report, indigenous peoples began to 
enter legal parlance and receive greater attention from 
international law bodies.  After reviewing the Cobo Report, the 
U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention and Protection of 
Minorities established a Working Group of its own on 
indigenous peoples.  For its part, the Working Group undertook 
a second study on indigeneity.41  Concluding that  
no single legal definition could account for the complexity and 
regional variation of the concept [of indigeneity and] . . . focusing 
on key factors [such as] . . . priority in time, voluntary 
perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness, self-identification, and a 
historic or present experience in subjugation, marginalization, 
dispossession, exclusion, [and] discrimination [, the Working 
Group] . . . confirmed the . . . definition [of indigeneity] that Cobo 
had introduced.42 
In 1993, as a result of its efforts, the Working Group sent a 
first draft of what would become the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples through the 
Sub-Commission to the Commission on Human Rights.43  In 
                                                          
39 Id. at 199. See generally  Special Rapporteur to the Sub-Comm’n on the 
Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Study of the Problem of 
Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, Comm’n on Human Rights,  
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.4 (July 14, 1983) (by José Martínez 
Cobo).  
40 Standard-Setting Activities, supra note 4, ¶ 24. 
41 Wiessner, supra note 18, at 1153. 
42 Pelican, supra note 1, at 56. 
43 Id. at 55. 
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turn, the Commission revised the draft for submission to the 
General Assembly.44  By 2006, the draft was accepted and, by 
2007, the Declaration entered into force as a multilateral treaty 
under international law.45   
Sensitive to the initial Cobo Report and creating 
affirmative rights for indigenous peoples in accordance with its 
recommendations, the Declaration called on states to preserve 
“the right of indigenous peoples to own, develop, control, and 
use the lands and territories that they have traditionally 
owned or otherwise occupied.”46  In addition, the Declaration 
enshrined “the right of self-determination as its overarching 
normative commitment.”47  The treaty’s substantive language 
declares that “indigenous peoples have the right to self-
determination [and states that, b]y virtue of th[is] right[,] they 
[can] freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development.”48  While it 
was years in the making, the Declaration thus concretized a 
legal recognition of indigenous peoples in ways that sharply 
broke with the principles of law that initially marginalized 
them.  
III. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT 
A. African Mores and the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
Despite the positive strides of the Declaration, it was not 
initially accepted with unanimity.  In June of 2006, when the 
finalized draft of the Declaration came before the Human 
Rights Council, “it soon emerged that a group of African 
states . . . took exception to some [of its] formulations.”49  The 
African Group, made up of the full bloc of fifty-three African 
                                                          
44 Id. 
45 Macklem, supra note 22, at 200. 
46 Id. at 201. 
47 Id. at 200. 
48 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples art. 3, 
U.N. G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/1 (Sep. 13, 2007) [hereinafter 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples]. 
49 Pelican, supra note 1, at 55. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/5
  
166 PACE INT’L LAW REV. [Vol. XXIV:1 
Union nations,50 put together an Aide Memoire that laid out 
its trepidations about the draft’s offered definition of 
indigeneity and focus on self-determination rights.51  In its 
Aide Memoire, the African Group took the position that any 
principle of self-determination exercised by indigenous peoples 
should apply only to those “‘under colonial and/or foreign 
occupation.’”52 Otherwise, it opined, the right to self-
determination could be misinterpreted so as to justify 
secession and threaten “‘the political unity and [] territorial 
integrity’” of nation states.53 
The African Group was not alone in its misgivings.  The 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the 
highest operating judicial body on the African continent,54 
issued an Advisory Opinion on the proposed Declaration that 
highlighted additional concerns.55  In its opinion, the 
Commission emphasized that when it comes to indigeneity, 
rather than espouse a set legal definition, it is “much more . . 
. constructive to try to bring out the main characteristics”  of 
indigenous peoples so as not to diminish cultural differences. 
56  For its part, the African Commission defined indigeneity, 
in contrast to the Cobo Report, simply.  Indicating a marked 
break with the proposed Declaration’s idea of indigenous 
peoples, the Commission noted that it considered only “self-
identification, a special attachment to and use of . . . 
traditional lands, [and] a state of marginalization” to be 
legally dispositive.57  
B. African Mores and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 
The factious history of the Declaration can be explained by 
                                                          
50 Wiessner, supra note 18, at 1159. 
51 Pelican, supra note 1, at 55. 
52 African Grp., Draft Aide Memoire ¶ 3.1 (2006). 
53 Id. ¶ 3.2. 
54 See Christof Heyns, The African Regional Human Rights System: The 
African Charter, 108 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 679, 685 (2004).  
55 Pelican, supra note 1, at 55. 
56 Advisory Op. of the Afr. Comm’n of Human & Peoples’ Rights on the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Afr. 
Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 10 (2007). 
57 Id. ¶ 12.  
9
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Africa’s unique experience with indigeneity itself.  In Africa, 
the concept of indigeneity “differ[s] considerably from its 
meaning on other continents.”58  Lengthy “histories of 
conquest, assimilation, migration, and movement . . . make the 
criteria for deciding who is ‘indigenous’ far murkier”59 in Africa 
than elsewhere due to the fact that a “central historical feature 
of [African] colonialism and decolonization was the [formation] 
of an African state system established around rigid borders . . . 
that had little regard to prior existing communities and 
identities.”60  Today, “African societies tend to reproduce 
themselves at their internal frontiers, . . . [as they are] con-
tinuously creating and re-creating a dichotomy between 
original inhabitants and latecomers.”61  Thus, many African 
governments are opposed to the concept of indigeneity and 
argue “that all Africans are indigenous and should have 
equal” rights as such.62  Referring to this sentiment 
specifically in its Advisory Opinion, in fact, the African 
Commission noted that, “in Africa, the term indigenous 
populations does not mean ‘first peoples’ in reference to 
aboriginality as opposed to non-African communities or those 
having come from elsewhere.”63  This understanding, however, 
was manifested in the Declaration’s final version only vaguely 
in its preamble, which states: “the situation of indigenous 
peoples varies from region to region and from country to 
country.”64 
As a matter of law, thus, while regard for African cultural 
contexts played a great role in shaping the African reaction to 
the Declaration, it also played a great role in shaping the 
signing and ratification of another international treaty 
pertinent to Africa: the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights.  With the formation of the Organization of 
African Unity in 1963, “independent African states affirmed 
                                                          
58 Pelican, supra note 1, at 56. 
59 Hodgson, supra note 3, at 1037. 
60 Dwight G. Newman, The Law and Politics of Indigenous Rights in the 
Postcolonial African State, 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 69, 70 (2008). 
61 Pelican, supra note 1, at 52–53.  
62 Id. at 53.  
63 Id.   
64 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 48, at 
pmbl. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/5
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their solidarity in the quest for [a] better life of the ‘African 
peoples.’”65  In 1981, this solidarity was implemented through 
the adoption of the African Charter.66   The Charter, which 
takes “an integrated approach towards the concept of . . . 
rights, enshrining [at once] . . . civil and political rights 
(libertarian rights); . . . economic, social, and cultural rights 
(egalitarian rights); and . . . peoples’ or group rights (solidarity 
rights),”67 was passed with “‘a remarkable degree of consensus’” 
on the part of African states.68  Ratified very quickly, the 
African Charter entered into force only five years after its 
initial drafting,69  all fifty-three member states of the African 
Union becoming parties to it.70   
Although Article 1 of the Charter almost forbiddingly 
provides that state parties are obligated, in binding fashion, to 
“recognize the rights, duties and freedoms [laid out under the 
treaty] and . . . [to] undertake to adopt . . . measures to give 
[them] effect,”71 African states did not withhold ratification.  
Because the Charter expressly requires state parties to take 
“into consideration the virtues of their historical tradition[s] 
and the values of African civilization[,] which [, the treaty 
emphasizes,] should inspire and characterize their reflection on 
the concept of human and [p]eoples rights,”72 the Charter was, 
as a whole, set up to be responsive to African contexts in its 
intents and purposes.  Indeed, the Charter’s irresistible 
“implication . . . is that African traditional values . . . are key to 
the realization of human rights” under a concept—with 
pertinence to this Note—much more broadly construed than 
                                                          
65 Lawrence Juma, Reconciling African Customary Law and Human 
Rights in Kenya: Making a Case for Institutional Reformation and 
Revitalization of Customary Adjudication Processes, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 
459, 486 (2002). 
66 Mirna E. Adjami, African Courts, International Law, and Comparative 
Case Law: Chimera or Emerging Human Rights Jurisprudence?, 24 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 103, 104 (2002).   
67 Nsongurua J. Udombana, Between Promise and Performance: Revis-
iting States’ Obligations Under the African Human Rights Charter, 40 STAN. 
J. INT’L L. 105, 112 (2004). 
68 Id. at 107.   
69 Id. 
70 Heyns, supra note 54, at 682.  
71 African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 1, June 
27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 [hereinafter African Charter]. 
72 Id. at  pmbl. 
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that of indigenous rights alone.73  Although the term “peoples” 
is nowhere defined in the African Charter, its use within its 
provisions ensures that “the beneficiaries of the rights 
enshrined in the [treaty] are both individuals and . . . groups,”74 
namely the indigenous.75  
Despite the Charter’s emphasis on African values, 
however, the African Charter encompasses “a very expansive 
approach [with] respect to [its own] interpretation.”76  Even as 
indigenous rights are inherent under the African Charter, they 
are not exclusive.  Ultimately, under the treaty’s provisions, 
African mores do not function independently of those espoused 
internationally.  Articles 60 and 61 of the Charter “‘bring the 
African human rights mechanism within the positive influence 
of . . . other regional human rights experiences’” because these 
provisions ensure that the Charter’s legal interpretation relies 
extensively on international sources of law.77  For its part, 
Article 60 requires the African Commission, the judicial body 
responsible for determining the treaty’s legal scope,78  to:  
draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples’ 
rights, particularly from the provisions of various African 
instruments on human and peoples’ rights, the Charter of the 
United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of African 
Unity, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other 
instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African 
countries in the field of human and peoples’ rights as well as 
from the provisions of various instruments adopted within the 
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations.79  
Similarly, Article 61 requires the African Commission to: 
take into consideration, as subsidiary measures to determine [] 
principles of law, other general or special international 
conventions, laying down rules expressly recognized by member 
states of the Organization of African Unity, African practices 
consistent with international norms on human and people’s 
                                                          
73 Juma, supra note 65, at 478.  
74 Udombana, supra note 67, at 124. 
75 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 96; see also REPORT OF THE AFRICAN 
COMMISSION’S WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS, supra note 5, at 79. 
76 Heyns, supra note 54, at 688. 
77 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 87. 
78 Heyns, supra note 54, at 693. 
79 African Charter, supra note 71, art. 60. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/5
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rights, customs generally accepted as law, general principles of 
law recognized by African states as well as legal precedents and 
doctrine.80 
 Overall, in construing the Charter, the African 
Commission is bound to “accept legal arguments with the 
support of appropriate and relevant international and regional 
human rights instruments, principles, norms, and standards.”81     
IV. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE KENYAN CONTEXT 
Even as the Charter provides a highly pertinent body of 
rights, like the Declaration, it was not initially met with 
unanimity.  Although the Charter “suggests [in Article 1] at 
least a formal commitment by African [s]tates to conform their 
national law and practice to international standards . . . , most 
African states have fallen short of what is expected of them” in 
this respect.82  Legally, the applicability of the African Charter 
is determined within the African context at the domestic law 
level by lingering colonial jurisprudence.83  While Africans 
states with a civil law colonial heritage are generally legal 
“monists [that] insist that international law and internal law 
are part of the same order, [African states with a common law 
colonial heritage are legal] . . . dualists [that] insist that 
‘international law and internal law are two separate legal 
orders, existing independently of one another.’”84  In the former 
British colony of Kenya, where the Endorois tribe was 
displaced from their land, the enforcement of international 
treaties like the African Charter “require[s as a prerequisite] 
the passing of an enabling Act of Parliament” along the lines of 
Anglophone common law tradition.85  In Kenya, because such 
an enabling Act was never forthcoming, British schemes of law 
proved instrumental to the way in which the Charter impacted, 
or rather failed to impact, indigenous groups like the Endorois.   
Legally, British jurisprudence was first imposed on Kenya 
                                                          
80 Id. art. 61. 
81 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 93. 
82 Udombana, supra note 67, at 107–08. 
83 Adjami, supra note 66, at 110.  
84 Udombana, supra note 67, at 125. 
85 Juma, supra note 65, at 493. 
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when the country became a protectorate in 1895.86  Kenya’s 
status as a protectorate “conferred on the British . . . the power 
to exercise full jurisdiction in the colony and to set up a system 
of government therein.”87  Concerned particularly with 
questions of land ownership, in 1915, the British passed the 
Native Trust Lands Ordinances, which, taken together,  
creat[ed] two separate property domains. The first regime, 
‘Crown Land,’ constituted radical title over all ‘waste and 
unoccupied land’ and vested it in the colonial sovereign.  The 
second regime, ‘Native Areas,’ vested ultimate control of all other 
land actually occupied by African communities in a Native Lands 
Trust Board . . . [sitting] in London.88 
Under the Ordinances, British authorities exercised full 
governance over Kenyan territory.  Indigenous peoples had 
claim to their land by trust alone, a fact that remained 
unaltered even upon independence, as, after the colonial 
government was dismantled, the British passed title to 
indigenous reserves into the hands of local Kenyan County 
Councils, which continued to implement the trust system.89   
Indeed, upon independence, Kenya “embraced the political 
blueprint of colonial territoriality in terms of both space and 
power.”90  Though, during the independence period, Kenyan 
political parties vied for different approaches to land 
legislation, ultimately, the colonial model won out.  At 
independence, Kenya became “a one-party state.”91  The clash 
between Kenya’s political parties: the Kenya African 
Democratic Party (“KADU”) and the Kenya African National 
Union (“KANU”), ended with KADU’s defeat.   Though KADU 
advocated “for [the] restoration of pre-colonial land spheres that 
ethnic groups inhabited”92 and wanted to “give Kenya’s politics 
                                                          
86 Id. at 477. 
87 Id. 
88 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 61. 
89 Id. 
90 David M. Anderson, ‘Yours in the Struggle for Majimbo’. Nationalism 
and the Party Politics of Decolonization in Kenya, 1955–64, 40 J. CONTEMP. 
HIST. 547, 558 (2005).  
91 Id. at 563. 
92 Karuti Kanyinga, The Legacy of the White Highlands: Land Rights, 
Ethnicity, and the Post-2007 Election Violence in Kenya, 27 J. CONTEMP. AFR. 
STUD. 325, 329 (2009). 
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a ‘tribal foundation,’”93 its policies did not make it to the 
political fore.  KANU, which advocated for a “federal structure of 
government in which regions were responsible for administration 
of land in their territories”94—and which “derided [KADU] as 
[being comprised of] tribalists who opposed the broader goals of 
nationalism”95—was better financed and won the pre-
independence elections.96   
After independence, instead of facing KADU’s plans for a 
Constitution creating six regions operating with their own civil 
services to implement local legislation,97 Kenyan indigenous 
groups, like the Endorois, faced a Constitution that mirrored the 
laws left over by the British.  The Kenyan Constitution read all 
through the post-colonial period: “trust Land shall vest in the 
county council in whose area of jurisdiction it is situated.”98  The 
Constitution’s express language stated: 
[e]ach county council shall hold the Trust land vested in it for the 
benefit of the persons ordinarily resident on that land and shall 
give effect to such rights, interests or other benefits in respect of 
the land as may, under . . . African customary law . . . , be vested 
in any tribe, group, family or individual: [p]rovided that no right, 
interest or other benefit under African customary law shall have 
effect for the purposes of this subsection so far as it is repugnant 
to any written law.99 
Overall, the Kenyan Constitution privileged the state’s right to 
land over the community’s, as it even further allowed Kenya to 
set aside and expropriate trust land as a means of serving 
governmental purposes.100   
                                                          
93 Anderson, supra note 90, at 554. 
94 Kanyinga, supra note 92, at 328.    
95 Anderson, supra note 90, at 547. 
96 Kanyinga, supra note 92, at 561. Moreover, KANU effectively contri-
buted to KADU’s demise, as, after the elections, it “co-opted its leadership by 
appointing some [of its members] into [its] cabinet [in order to] . . . put the 
land question under the carpet.”  Id. 
97 Anderson, supra note 90, at 556. 
98 CONSTITUTION, art. 115(1) (2009). 
99 Id. art. 115(2).  
100 Id. art. 118.  
15
  
2012]             EXTENDING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS 173 
V. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS OF THE ENDOROIS COMMUNITY 
A. The Endorios’ Postcolonial Experience  
Thrust into a disadvantageous Constitutional framework, 
the Endorois experienced an increasingly unsettled 
relationship to their land in the postcolonial period.  A 
community comprised of roughly 400 families of Kalenjin-
speaking peoples—and a sub-group of the Tugen tribe that 
traditionally inhabited the Lake Bogoria region of Kenya’s Rift 
Valley—the Endorois are dependent on their cattle, goat, and 
sheep livestock for survival.101  Needing to graze these animals 
in Lake Bogoria’s lowlands during the rainy season and in the 
Monchongoi forest during the dry season in order to ensure 
yearlong access to fertile pastures, medicinal salt licks, and the 
lakefront for their pastoralist and religious practices,102 the 
Endorois underwent at independence a systematic 
marginalization from their indigenous ways of life.   
While British colonial rule vested legal control over their 
land  in a trust held by the local Baringo and Koibatek County 
Councils,103 actual “challenges to the Endorois’ . . . rights [to 
occupy] the Lake Bogoria region were made [upon] the gazetting 
of the area as a game reserve” during the 1970s.104  In 1973, 
Kenya removed the Endorois “from their traditional areas so 
that tourists [could] enjoy game viewing without disturbance 
by ‘backwards natives.’”105  Without being consulted about the 
state’s decision to make their land into a protected area and 
without being notified of the gazetting until after its 
implementation in 1977, the Endorois were summarily evicted  
from Lake Bogoria,106 displaced to a semi-arid location that was 
unsuitable to support their cultural practices,107 and denied 
compensation for their loss.108    
After years of seeking redress and being met only with 
                                                          
101 Morel, supra note 10, at 56. 
102 Id.  
103 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 62. 
104 Morel, supra note 10, at 56. 
105 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 110. 
106 Morel, supra note 10, at 56. 
107 Id. 
108 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 57. 
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“harassment, arbitrary arrests and intimidation,”109 eventually, 
the Endorois brought suit to challenge the legality of their 
eviction.  In 2002, the Kenyan High Court at Nakuru ruled on 
initial Endorois’ pleadings alleging constitutional violations 
associated with the restrictive trust management of the Baringo 
and Koibatek County Councils.110  In its opinion, the High 
Court stated that it could not address the community’s 
collective right to property.  Finding (1) that there was “no 
proper identity of the [Endorois] people who were affected by 
the setting aside of the[ir] land;”111 and (2) that “the law does 
not allow individuals to benefit from . . . a resource simply 
because they happen to be born close to” it,112 the High Court 
dismissed the Endorois’ case without ruling on whether any 
violations had resulted from their eviction.113  Relying merely 
on a statement that the Endorois had no legal claims available 
to them because the Trust Land Act affirmed a constitutional 
right under Kenyan law for the state to alienate land,114 the 
High Court stated that “it was too late [for the Endorois] to 
complain,”115 as they could not establish legal entitlement to 
territory properly set aside by the government.116  
In the face of the High Court’s judgment, though the 
Endorois first considered an appeal, because “the sheer 
inefficiency of the Kenyan court system conspired to deny 
the[ir] community further national remedies . . . [, they] sought 
redress [with] the African Commission” on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights.117  As part of Minority Rights Group International’s 
legal cases program, the Endorois initiated an entirely distinct 
case with an entirely distinct focus.118   
                                                          
109 Id. 
110 Sitetalia v. Baringo Country Council, (2002) 183 eK.L.R. 1, 2 (H.C.K.), 
available at http://kenyalaw.org/CaseSearch/view_preview1.php?link=665046 
31278573495228921&words=').   
111 Id. at 4. 
112 Id. at 5.   
113 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 63. 
114 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya) v. Kenya, Commc’n  No. 276/03, 
Afr. Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 69 (Feb. 10, 2010). Compare The Trust Land Act, 
(2009) Cap. 288 §§ 7–8, with CONSTITUTION, art. 117 (2009). 
115 Sitetalia, 182 eK.L.R. at 4.   
116 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n  No. 276/03, ¶ 12. 
117 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 63. 
118 Morel, supra note 10, at 55. 
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B. The Endorois’ Case Before the African Commission: 
Preliminary Matters 
In their pleadings before the African Commission, the 
Endorois put aside domestic Kenyan law and raised the issue 
of their eviction by way of the African Charter.119  Focusing on 
the African Commission case: Social and Economic Rights 
Action Centre for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, which 
dealt with Nigerian state actors permitting oil companies to 
destroy land owned by local citizens,120 the Endorois argued 
that the Charter “provides for peoples [legal claims] to retain 
their rights . . . as collectives.”121  In their complaint, the 
Endorois alleged that Kenya violated African Charter Articles 
8, which guarantees rights to religion;122 14, which guarantees 
rights to property;123 16, which guarantees rights to health;124 
17, which guarantees rights to culture;125 20, which guarantees 
rights to self-determination;126 21, which guarantees rights to 
natural resources;127 and 22, which guarantees rights to 
development,128 in displacing them from Lake Bogoria.129    
Established in 1987, a year after the African Charter came 
into force,130 the African Commission represented the best 
possible forum before which the Endorois could bring suit.  
Whereas the High Court at Nakuru examined the Endorois’ 
claims pursuant to domestic Kenyan law, the African 
Commission did not.  For “[t]he main mechanisms employed by 
the Commission to fulfill its task of supervising compliance 
with Charter norms,”131 are not bound by domestic law 
considerations.  As mentioned above, though many African 
                                                          
119 Id. at 57. 
120 Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. for Econ. & Soc. Rights v. Nigeria, 
Commc’n  No. 155/96, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 7 (2001). 
121 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n  No. 276/03, ¶ 75. 
122 African Charter, supra note 71, art. 8. 
123 Id. art. 14. 
124 Id. art. 16. 
125 Id. art. 17. 
126 Id. art. 20. 
127 Id. art. 21. 
128 Id. art. 22. 
129 Morel, supra note 10, at 57. 
130 Udombana, supra note 67, at 119. 
131 Heyns, supra note 54, at 693.  
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states, like Kenya, do not enforce the African Charter in their 
national courts because they do not accept it as a source of 
binding law absent implementing domestic legislation, the 
African Commission has 
focused on the principle of pacta sunt servanda: simply, the 
principle that agreements are binding and are to be implemented 
in good faith.  Under this principle, an African state’s ratification 
of the African Charter creates, for that state, an obligation that 
demands concrete results . . . A state cannot . . . invoke the 
provisions of its domestic legislation, including its [C]onstitution, 
to evade its treaty obligations.132 
In this respect, the Endorois prevailed at their case’s 
outset: the Commission was not deterred from hearing their 
claims.  Although Kenya, as the respondent state, initially 
tried to dismiss the Endorois’ pleadings on the grounds that 
Article 56 of the African Charter establishes admissibility 
requirements barring the Commission from hearing a case if 
local remedies have yet not been exhausted,133 the Commission 
did not find itself constrained.  Despite the fact that the 
Endorois did not try their case on appeal all the way through 
the Kenyan legal system, the Commission noted that because 
the Endorois “premised [their claims’] admissibility on two 
recognized exceptions to [Article 56’s local remedies] rule: the 
substantial nature of the violations and the non-existence of 
‘effective, available and efficient’ remedies within the Kenyan 
legal system,”134 the local remedies requirement did not apply 
to their case.135 
The first substantive aspect of the pleadings that the 
Commission analyzed, therefore, was the Endorois’ claim to 
indigenous identity itself.  Unlike the Kenyan High Court, the 
Commission found the Endorois to be a recognizable indigenous 
group.  While noting, at the outset, that “there is no universal 
and unambiguous definition of the concept” of indigeneity and 
that the concept of ‘peoples’ under the African Charter is 
                                                          
132 Udombana, supra note 67, at 126–27; see also Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 311. 
133 African Charter, supra note 71, art. 56.  
134 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 65.  
135 Heyns, supra note 54, at 695.  
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similarly indefinite,136 the Commission drew on its adopted 
Report of the Working Group of Experts on Indigenous 
Populations/Communities to hold that the African “notion of 
‘peoples’ is closely related to collective rights”137 and that 
collective rights, in turn, are an important criteria for 
identifying indigenous groups, as “self-identification as a 
distinct collectivity”138 is part of the internationally recognized 
legal definition of indigeneity under the Cobo Report.139   
In its opinion, the Commission dispelled Kenya’s argument 
that indigeneity ought to be narrowly defined and that the 
Endorois, as a mere Kalenjin-speaking sub-group of the Tugen 
tribe, could not qualify.140  The Commission relied on the case 
of Saramaka People v. Suriname, in which the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights recognized—via the American 
Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees the respective 
rights of all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the treaty, 
without regard to national or social origin141—the collective 
land rights of a tribal community, some of whose members did 
not occupy the same precise history, territory, or customs of the 
larger super-class of which they were a part.142  Supplementing 
the Charter’s notion of ‘peoples’ with international case law, 
the Commission adopted an expansive definition of indigeneity 
and found the Endorois to possess legitimate claims to group 
identity under the African Charter.143   
                                                          
136 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya) v. Kenya, Commc’n  No. 276/03, 
Afr. Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 147 (Feb. 10, 2010). 
137 Id. ¶ 149.  
138 Id. ¶ 150. 
139 See id. ¶ 152.  
140 Id. ¶ 145.   
141 American Convention on Human Rights art. 1(1), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention].   
142 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶ 
79–86 (Nov. 28, 2007). 
143 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n  No. 276/03, ¶ 162. 
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C. The Endorois’ Case Before the African Commission: Charter 
Violations 
1. Article 8: The Right to Religion  
Upon acknowledging the Endorois as a recognizable 
indigenous group, the Commission was free to address Kenya’s 
alleged Charter violations.  The Commission started its 
analysis with Article 8 and the Endorois’ claims that Kenya 
violated its guarantee of the right to the “free practice of 
religion”144 by expelling them from their land and religious 
sites.145 Looking to the Human Rights Committee’s 
interpretation of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”)146—which states that “everyone 
shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion”147—the Commission first established that the 
Endorois’ cultural practices constituted a religion under 
international law.148 It relied on the Human Rights 
Committee’s interpretation of the ICCPR, which holds that it 
“‘protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs,”149 as well 
as its own jurisprudence in Free Legal Assistance Group v. 
Zaire, which held, in the context of a case about the state 
persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses,150 that religious freedom is 
associated with groups that assemble “in connection with a 
belief” under the broad scope of Charter Article 8.151 
In addition, the Commission relied on its own case law in 
Amnesty International v. Sudan, about the state persecution of 
                                                          
144 African Charter, supra note 71, art. 8. 
145 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n  No. 276/03, ¶ 163. 
146 Id. ¶ 164. 
147 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18(1), opened 
for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].   
148 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n  No. 276/03, ¶ 168.  
149 Id. ¶ 164; accord Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 22, ¶ 
2, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (July 30, 1993).  
150 Free Legal Assistance Grp. v. Zaire, Commc’n Nos. 25/89, 47/90, 
56/91, 100/93, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 3 (1995). 
151 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n  No. 276/03, ¶ 165; see 
Free Legal Assistance Grp., Commc’n  Nos. 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93, ¶ 45. 
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non-Muslims,152 to hold that any government restriction on 
religious practices pursuant to Article 8 must be “proportionate 
to the specific need on which [it is] predicated.”153  In terms of 
the Endorois, the Commission noted that Kenya did not contest 
the community’s religious claims to the area around Lake 
Bogoria154 and that the state’s reasons for their “complete and 
total expulsion”155 from it were insufficient to show that it had 
“any significant . . . interest[s] . . . [, as] allowing . . . [the 
Endorois to] practice [their] religion [on the game reserve] 
would not detract from [the state’s] goal of conservation or 
developing the areas [of Lake Bogoria] for economic reasons.”156  
Thus, in evicting the Endorois from their land, the Commission 
held Kenya to be in violation of Article 8 of the African 
Charter.157   
2. Article 14: The Right to Property  
After having ruled on the Endorois’ right to religion, the 
Commission proceeded to examine Article 14 of the African 
Charter and the applicability of its provision stating: “the right 
to property shall be guaranteed.”158  In the face of Kenya’s 
argument that the creation of the game reserve was legal 
under domestic Kenyan law,159 the Commission accepted the 
Endorois’ claim that “‘property rights have an autonomous 
meaning under international human rights law [that] 
supersede national legal definitions.”160 In its opinion, the 
Commission looked to its own jurisprudence, to the cases of 
Malawi African Association v. Mauritania, about the state’s 
discrimination against black Mauritanian ethnic groups,161 and 
                                                          
152 Amnesty Int’l v. Sudan, Commc’n Nos. 48/90, 50/91, 52/91, 89/93, Afr. 
Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 76 (1999). 
153 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 172; see 
Amnesty Int’l, Commc’n Nos. 48/90, 50/91, 52/91, 89/93, ¶ 80. 
154 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n  No. 276/03, ¶ 167.  
155 Id. ¶ 172. 
156 Id. ¶ 173.   
157 Id. 
158 African Charter, supra note 71, art. 14.   
159 See Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/2003, ¶¶ 
176–77.  
160 Id. ¶ 185. 
161 Malawi African Ass’n v. Mauritania, Commc’n Nos. 54/91, 61/91, 
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Social and Economic Rights Action Center for Economic and 
Social Rights v. Nigeria, about the state’s seizure of local land 
for oil development projects,162 to establish that the right to 
property under Article 14 “includes not only the right to have 
access to one’s property . . . , but also the right to [have] 
undisturbed possession, use and control of such property.”163  
Supplementing its own case law with that from the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, the Commission drew on the cases of 
Doǧan v. Turkey and Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni 
Community v. Nicaragua to rule that, under international law, 
even groups that are unable to produce legal title to land, such 
as the villagers in the first case164 and the indigenous group in 
the second case,165 have rights to property because such rights 
are born out of possession alone under precepts established by 
such treaties as the Protocol to the Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms166—which states that 
“every natural person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of 
his possessions”167—and the American Convention on Human 
Rights168—which states that “everyone has the right to the use 
and enjoyment of his property.”169   
Indeed, focusing on indigenous case law, the Commission 
went on to analyze the case of Saramaka People v. Suriname, 
which discussed Suriname’s failure to recognize tribal rights to 
                                                                                                                                  
98/93, 164/97 à 196/97, 210/98, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 3 (2000). 
162 Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. for Econ. & Soc. Rights v. Nigeria, 
Commc’n  No. 155/96, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 6 (2001). 
163 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/2003, ¶ 186 
(expansively construing the right to property discussed in these cases). See 
Malawi African Ass’n, Commc’n Nos. 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97 à 196/97, 
210/98, ¶ 128; Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. for Econ. & Soc. Rights, 
Commc’n No. 155/96, ¶¶ 60–62.  
164 Doǧan v. Turkey, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 231, 263. 
165 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 151 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
166 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶¶ 188–
189; see Doǧan, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 266.  
167 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.  
168 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n  No. 276/03, ¶ 190; see 
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty., (ser. C) No. 79, ¶¶ 151, 154.  
169 American Convention, supra note 141, art. 21.   
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land under the American Convention,170 and held that a state’s 
failure to recognize such claims “becomes a [wholesale] 
violation of the ‘right to property.’”171  Based on Saramaka 
People, the Commission found that the gazetting of the 
Endorois’ land was “inadequate” under the African Charter 
despite domestic Kenyan law.172  Noting that the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
“bestows the right of [land] ownership rather than mere access 
. . . [and] ensures that indigenous peoples can engage with the 
state . . . as active stakeholders rather than as passive 
beneficiaries,”173 the Commission ruled: “mere access or de 
facto ownership of land is not compatible with principles of 
international law.  Only de jure ownership can guarantee 
indigenous peoples’ effective protection.”174   
With respect to the right to property, the Commission also 
ruled that African legal norms mandate a two-pronged test 
that Kenya was required to meet before it could legally deprive 
                                                          
170 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 
3 (Nov. 28, 2007).   
171 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n  No. 276/03, ¶ 192. 
172 Id. ¶ 199. 
173 Id. ¶ 204. See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra 
note 48, art. 8(2)(b) (stating that “[s]tates shall provide effective mechanisms 
for prevention of, and redress for: [a]ny action which has the aim or effect of 
dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources.”); id. art. 10 
(stating that “[n]o relocation shall take place without the free, prior and 
informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on 
just and fair compensation and, where possible, with the option of return.”); 
id. art. 25 (stating that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to maintain and 
develop their political, economic and social systems or institutions, to be 
secure in the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence and development, 
and to engage freely in all their traditional and other economic activities.”); 
id. art. 26(3) (stating that “[s]tates shall give legal recognition and protection 
to th[e] lands, territories and resources [of indigenous peoples and that s]uch 
recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and 
land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.”); id. art. 27 
(stating that “[s]tates shall establish and implement, in conjunction with 
indigenous peoples concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open and 
transparent process, giving due recognition to indigenous peoples’ laws, 
traditions, customs and land tenure systems, to recognize and adjudicate the 
rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands, territories and 
resources, including those which were traditionally owned or otherwise 
occupied or used [and that i]ndigenous peoples shall have the right to 
participate in this process.”).  
174 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 205; see 
Saramaka People, (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 110.  
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the Endorois of their land.175  Holding that because Article 14 
states that land encroachment must be performed “‘in the 
interest of the public need . . . ’ as well as ‘in accordance with 
appropriate laws,’”176 the Commission defined the ‘in the 
interest of the public need’ test as a high threshold.177  Drawing 
on the U.N. Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights, which drafted a report on indigenous peoples 
positing that “limitations, if any, on the right [of] indigenous 
peoples to their natural resources must flow only from the most 
urgent and compelling interest[s],”178 the Commission held that 
limitations on the right to property under the African Charter 
“should be [interpreted to be] least restrictive.”179  In the 
instant case, the Commission concluded that Kenya’s were not 
according its own ruling in Constitutional Rights Project v. 
Nigeria, which held that a state “may not erode a right such 
that the right itself becomes illusory,”180 as the right to 
property became for the Endorois when they lost access to Lake 
Bogoria.    
Furthermore, in terms of the ‘in accordance with the law’ 
test, the Commission noted that two requirements are imposed 
on states like Kenya with respect to appropriated land: one of 
consultation and one of compensation.181  Returning to the logic 
of Saramaka People, which held that the American Convention 
guarantees indigenous groups the right to preserve their 
customary relationships with land,182  the Commission found 
that the “effective participation of the members of [indigenous] 
people [in the governance of their territories must be] in 
                                                          
175 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 211. 
176 Id.; accord African Charter, supra note 71, art. 14 (stating that “[t]he 
right to property shall be guaranteed [and that i]t may only be encroached 
upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the 
community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.”).   
177 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 212.  
178 Special Rapporteur of Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion & Prot. of 
Human Rights, The Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Indi-
genous Peoples, Comm’n on Human Rights, ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2 
/2004/30 (July 13, 2004) (by Erica-Irene A. Daes). 
179 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 214. 
180 Id. ¶ 215; accord Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria, Commc’n  
Nos. 140/94, 141/94, 145/95, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 42 (1999).   
181 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 225. 
182 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶ 
95–96 (Nov. 28, 2007).  
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conformity with their customs and traditions.”183  Stating that 
Kenya failed to allow the Endorois to participate in the 
creation of the game reserve, the Commission relied on Article 
28 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples and upheld its language affirming that 
indigenous groups have the right to restitution of or 
compensation for the lands they traditionally occupied or 
used.184 Accordingly, the African Commission found Kenya to 
be in violation of Article 14 of the African Charter.185 
3. Article 17: The Right to Culture 
Following its discussion of the right to property, the 
African Commission next analyzed the Endorois’ claim that 
Kenya denied the group cultural rights under African Charter 
Article 17. Article 17 states not only that “every individual may 
freely[] take part in the cultural life of his community,”186 but 
that “[t]he promotion and protection of morals and traditional 
values recognized by the community shall be the duty of the 
State.”187  In this respect, the Commission held that the 
Charter places a burden on African states to preserve the 
“cultural heritage essential to [indigenous] group identity.”188  
Relying on the Human Rights Committee’s statement—made 
in reference to ICCPR Article 25, which affirms: “minorities 
shall not be denied the right . . . to enjoy their own culture”189—
the Commission held that “culture manifests itself in many 
forms, including . . . way[s] of life associated with the use of 
land resources . . . in the case of indigenous peoples.”190  The 
                                                          
183 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 227.  
184 Id. ¶ 232; accord Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
supra note 48, art. 28 (stating that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to 
redress, by means that can include restitution or, when this is not possible, 
just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and resources 
which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and 
which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their 
free, prior and informed consent.”).  
185 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n  No. 276/03, ¶ 238.   
186 African Charter, supra note 71, art. 17(2). 
187 Id. art. 17(3). 
188 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n  No. 276/03, ¶ 241. 
189 ICCPR, supra note 147, art. 27.  
190 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n  No. 276/03, ¶ 243; 
accord Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 23, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. HRI/ 
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Commission then examined the Report of the Working Group 
on Indigenous Populations/Communities, specifically focusing 
its attention on its idea that land dispossession is a major 
threat facing indigenous groups today,191 and concluded that 
states like Kenya are bound under international law to 
“creat[e] spaces for dominant and indigenous cultures to co-
exist.”192   
In its opinion, the Commission ruled that Kenya had a 
high duty towards the Endorois with respect to the creation of 
the game reserve on their land.193  The Commission noted in 
particular that Article 17 lacks a “claw-back clause,” 
interpreting this fact to mean that the Charter gives African 
states no leeway for failing to promote cultural rights.  Indeed, 
the Commission found that Kenya’s responsibility to protect 
the Endorois’ culture was non-derogable and had to be 
proportionate to its legitimate aims as a state.194  Explaining 
the rule of proportionality, the Commission asserted that 
Kenya deprived the Endorois of the right to culture because it 
“denied the community access to an integrated system of 
beliefs, values, norms, mores, traditions, and artifacts closely 
linked”195 with Lake Bogoria despite the fact that such access 
would have posed no harm to the reserve or Kenya’s economic 
incentives to develop it.196  All in all, the Commission ruled 
that Kenya violated Charter Article 17 by failing to adequately 
protect the Endorois’ indigenous practices.197 
4. Article 21: The Right to Resources 
Once the Commission granted the Endorois cultural rights, 
it next turned its attention to their resource rights under 
Article 21 of the African Charter, which states that “all peoples 
                                                                                                                                  
GEN/1/Rev.1 (Apr. 8, 1994).  
191 See Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n  No. 276/03, ¶ 
244; see REPORT OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION’S WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS, 
supra note 5, at 20. 
192 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n  No. 276/03, ¶ 247. 
193 Id. ¶ 248. 
194 Id. ¶ 249. 
195 Id. ¶ 250. 
196 Id. ¶ 249. 
197 Id. ¶ 251.  
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shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources.”198  
Examining Kenya’s claims that the Endorois never fully lost 
access to their land because revenues from the game reserve 
went into financing local projects through distributions made 
by the Baringo and Koibatek County Councils,199 the African 
Commission drew on the case of Social and Economic Rights 
Action Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria to hold 
that indigenous communities have a general “right to natural 
resources contained within their traditional lands”200 because 
this case barred state oil drilling companies from destroying 
local property for economic development initiatives under the 
scope of Article 21.201   
Pursuant to the supplementary authority of Saramaka 
People v. Suriname—which interpreted the American 
Convention’s guarantee that “everyone has the right to the use 
and enjoyment of his property”202 to mean that a state is 
precluded from interfering with the resources located on 
indigenous land without first consulting with the indigenous 
peoples and including them in benefits derived therefrom203—
the Commission emphasized that international law holds that 
indigenous groups “have the [broad] right to the use and 
enjoyment of the natural resources that lie on and within 
the[ir] land”204 as long as these resources have some aggregate 
connection to their territories as a whole.205  Referencing the 
idea that Kenya had a duty not only to consult with the 
Endorois about the disposal of the resources found on their 
territory, but to give them a reasonable chance to participate in 
any resulting benefits,206 the Commission noted that because 
Kenya’s appropriation of Lake Bogoria had the composite effect 
of depriving the Endorois’ of wealth associated with the region, 
                                                          
198 African Charter, supra note 71, art. 21. 
199 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n  No. 276/03, ¶ 253. 
200 Id. ¶ 255. 
201 See Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. for Econ. & Soc. Rights v. Nigeria, 
Commc’n No. 155/96, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R., ¶¶ 56–57 (2001). 
202 American Convention, supra note 141, art. 21.   
203 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 
155 (Nov. 28, 2007). 
204 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 257; see 
Saramaka People, (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 155. 
205 See Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 266. 
206 Id. ¶ 268; accord Saramaka People, (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 155. 
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Kenya was in violation of Article 21.207   
5. Article 22: The Right to Development 
As the final consideration of its opinion, the African 
Commission considered Article 22 of the African Charter, 
which affirms not only that “[a]ll peoples shall have the right to 
[] economic, social and cultural development,”208 but that 
“state[s] shall have the duty . . . to ensure” such right.209  
Dismissing Kenya’s argument that the Endorois were given 
development rights because the Baringo and Koibatek County 
Councils allocated funds from the game reserve to local 
community programs,210 the Commission held that the right to 
development is governed by a two pronged test of constitutive 
and instrumental elements.211  Noting that the right to 
development, which is still emerging in international law,212 
“has been posited to require the fulfillment of five main 
criteria: that it must be equitable, non-discriminatory, 
participatory, accountable, and transparent, with equity and 
choice as important, over-arching themes,”213 the Commission 
drew on the Working Group on Indigenous Populations’ 
statement214 that “indigenous peoples [must] not [be] coerced, 
pressured or intimidated in their choice of development.”215  
Examining the Report of the Working Group of Experts on 
Indigenous Populations/Communities, the Commission then 
                                                          
207 See Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶¶ 
255, 268.  
208 African Charter, supra note 71, art. 22(1).   
209 Id. art. 22(2). 
210 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 274. 
211 Id. ¶ 277. 
212 Stephen Marks, The Human Right to Development: Between Rhetoric 
and Reality, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. REV. 137, 137 (2004).     
213 Id. See generally Arjun Sengupta, Development Cooperation and the 
Right to Development (Harvard School of Public Health, Working Paper No. 
12, 2003).  
214 Anoanella-Iulia Motoc & The Tebtebba Found., Preliminary Working 
Paper on the Principle of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent of Indigenous 
Peoples in Relation to Development Affecting Their Lands and Natural 
Resources that Would Serve as a Framework for the Drafting of a Legal 
Commentary by the Working Group on this Concept, Comm’n on Human 
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2004/4 (July 8, 2004).  
215 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 279; 
accord Motoc & The Tebtebba Found., supra note 214, ¶ 14(a).  
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asserted that “its own [legal] standards state that a 
[g]overnment must consult with . . . indigenous peoples . . . 
when dealing with sensitive issues [such] as land.”216   
In its opinion, the Commission ruled that Kenya, by 
presenting the game reserve to the Endorois “as a fait 
accompli,” failed to give the group a proper opportunity to have 
a say in the development of their land.217  Supporting this 
analysis by relying on Saramaka People v. Suriname,218 which 
held, as noted above, that indigenous groups must have a role 
in state plans developed for their territories,219 the Commission 
ruled that “benefit sharing is key to the development process” 
under international law.220  Accordingly, the Commission found 
that Kenya was obligated under Charter Article 22 not only to 
allow the Endorois “to reasonably share in the benefits 
[accrued] as a result of [the state’s] . . . deprivation of their 
right to use and enjo[y]” Lake Bogoria,221 but to ensure that 
favorable conditions at Lake Bogoria were protected so that the 
community could develop of its own accord there in the 
future.222  
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ENDOROIS’ CASE  
At the end of Centre for Minority Rights Development 
(Kenya) v. Kenya, the African Commission found Kenya to 
have violated African Charter Articles 8, 14, 17, 21, and 22 
by evicting the Endorois from Lake Bogoria.  Based on this 
finding, the Commission urged Kenya to: 
(a) [r]ecognize rights of ownership to the Endorois and [r]estitute 
Endorois ancestral land[;] (b) [e]nsure that the Endorois 
community has unrestricted access to Lake Bogoria and 
surrounding religious sites for religious and culture rites . . . [;] 
(c) [p]ay adequate compensation to the community for all loss 
                                                          
216 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 281; 
accord REPORT OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION’S WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS, 
supra note 5, at 12.  
217 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 281. 
218 Id. ¶ 289. 
219 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), ¶ 155 
(Nov. 28, 2007). 
220 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 295. 
221 Id.  
222 Id. ¶ 298. 
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suffered[;] (d) [p]ay royalties to the Endorois from existing 
economic activities and ensure that they benefit from 
employment possibilities within the Reserve[;] (e) [g]rant 
registration to the Endorois Welfare Committee[;] (f) [e]ngage in 
dialogue with the Complainants for the effective implementation 
of these recommendations[; and] (g) [r]eport on the 
implementation of these recommendations within three months 
from the notification[,]223      
exhorting the state to comply broadly with its obligations 
under the African Charter. Indeed, in its opinion, the 
Commission held Kenya to a high standard, one far 
surpassing that applicable to the Endorois under domestic 
Kenyan law alone.  Making full use of African Charter 
Articles 60 and 61—particularly their permissive reinfor-
cement of reliance on legal tenants established in both 
African and international law224—the African Commission 
engaged in expansive legal interpretation by granting the 
Endorois renewed access to their land.225   
While the Commission thus provided a liberal basis for 
the restitution of the Endorois’ rights, however, Centre for 
Minority Rights Development (Kenya) v. Kenya did not 
ultimately come down without limitations.  It remains the case 
that the African Commission is not delegated the power to 
enforce its judgments vis-à-vis the African Charter under 
current law.   The recommendations urged by the Commission 
are not effectively binding on Kenya.   Because the Commission 
lacks enforcement mechanisms under the Charter, Kenya is 
merely encouraged to “‘adopt measures in conformity’” with its 
                                                          
223 Id.   
224 See African Charter, supra note 71, art. 60; id. art 61. 
225 Indeed, by employing the African Charter, the African Commission 
engaged in a more expansive kind of legal reasoning than that espoused 
along traditional lines by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) under 
Article 38 of the Statue of the International Court of Justice.  Article 38, 
which permits the ICJ to make its decisions, in ranked order, by applying: “a. 
international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations; [and] d. . . . judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,” is 
less flexible than African Charter. Statute of the International Court of 
Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
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holdings;226 as a matter of law, Kenya is not necessarily bound 
to carry them out.227   
Despite the unbinding nature of the decision, Centre for 
Minority Rights Development (Kenya) nonetheless represents a 
weighty indication of the way in which indigenous rights have 
advanced within international law.  Through its own reliance 
on international legal authority with respect to indigeneity, the 
case reveals that “indigenous peoples [can] now allude to 
international norms supporting . . . claims” and advancing 
rights on issues extending in scope from religion to 
development.228   
Moreover, the Centre for Minority Rights Development 
(Kenya) decision stands as a particularly salient view of 
indigenous rights in a broader sense.  Though the case has 
been criticized for failing to explicitly extend the Endorois’ 
rights to land under the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples,229 the African Commission did 
not need to rely on this treaty in order to rule in favor of the 
Endorois.  In construing the African Charter, the Commission 
made it clear that the Endorois’ rights as indigenous peoples 
are extant not because the Endorois are indigenous per se, but 
because they are peoples under the broad language and scope 
of the African Charter,230 a legal mechanism that is simply 
flexible enough to encompass within its interpretative 
framework the means for protecting indigeneity as set out 
under international law.231  The indigenous, in African 
jurisprudence anyway, do not need to be separately protected 
in order to have legally viable claims.  On purely rhetorical 
grounds, therefore, Centre for Minority Rights Development 
(Kenya) exemplifies a pinnacle of legal recognition for 
indigenous peoples and a decisive rejection of the kind of 
lawmaking that once siloed their rights.  
                                                          
226 Heyns, supra note 54, at 695.  
227 Id.  
228 Seth Korman, Comment, Indigenous Ancestral Lands and Customary 
International Law, 32 HAWAII L. REV. 391, 393 (2010). 
229 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 58.  
230 See African Charter, supra note 71, art. 19. 
231 See REPORT OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION’S WORKING GROUP OF 
EXPERTS, supra note 5, at 79.   
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